

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

REPORT FOR (month/year)

DATE November 7, 2003

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within fifteen days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

National Railroad Passenger Corp.
30th Street Station
Third Floor - South Tower Box 41
Philadelphia, PA 19104

MAIL TO

Mr. David Myers
Regional Administrator
Federal Railroad Administration
International Plaza Two - Suite 550
Philadelphia, PA 19103

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)

Deputy Chief Engineer
Communications and Signals

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3 and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

RA - Automatic	EM - Electromechanical
AB - Automatic Block	EP - Electropneumatic
ACS - Automatic Cab Signal	FP - False Proceed
APB - Absolute Permissive Block	MB - Manual Block
ATC - Automatic Train Control	M - Mechanical
ATS - Automatic Train Stop	P - Pneumatic
CL - Color Light	PL - Position Light
CPL - Color Position Light	SA - Semiautomatic
E - Electric	TC - Traffic Control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1. BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input type="checkbox"/> TC				
2. INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTOMATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MANUAL	October 31, 2003		Route locking	Union Interlocking Rahway N.J.
3. AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4. OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: On October 31, 2003 at approximately 7:15 Am New Jersey Transit train No. 3818 derailed while diverting No. 1 to "A" track west end of Union Interlocking over No. 43-switch reverse. The train remained upright, with only the lead MU derailed. There were No passenger injuries associated with the derailment. Investigation found that signal circuit wiring revisions completed incorrectly in May 2001 caused this derailment. As a result of this mistake by Amtrak signal employees the Route Locking was ineffective when the first circuit was occupied on No. 1 track in advance of the 44L signal when NJT 3818 passed the signal. Although Union Interlocking doesn't have a event recording of signal functions {No Event Recorder Installed} NJT 3818 Locomotive event recorder indicated that the cab signal changed from 120 {Approach Medium} to 75-code rate {Approach} when the train crossed the insulated joints located close to 43-switch points. This event recording information indicates that the points of 43-switch had to move away from the reverse position toward normal position because the track circuit is designed with separate feeds that correspond with switch position. The C&S department believes that the tower lever man was able to operate the No. 43-switch to the normal position, and then back to the original reverse position in the face of NJT 3818 {however, the lever man states that he never threw the switch when NJT3818 was traversing the route} This action caused the first MU car to derail when the first wheel set of the truck went toward No. 1 track, instead of No. "A" track. On October 31, 2001 C&S forces resolved the wiring problem; however, on Monday November 3, 2003 the 43-switch was removed from service pending the completion of a full point check of all revised circuits. Discipline investigations will be scheduled for the responsible employees, as well as an inspection of other projects that were completed by the same Supervisor crew.