

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)
01/25/2003

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad and region or division)

**CSX
Transportation
Train Control**

REPORTING CARRIER (signature/title)

Director Signal Reliability

All Railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Admin.
61 Forsyth St SW
Suite 16T20
Atlanta, Ga. 30303

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g., assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block System.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

- A-Automatic
- AB-Automatic block
- ACS-Automatic cab signal
- APB-Absolute permissive block
- ATC-Automatic train control
- ATS-Automatic train stop
- CL-Color light
- CPL-Color position light
- E-Electric
- EM-Electromechanical
- EP-Electropneumatic
- FP-False proceed
- MB-Manual block
- M-Mechanical
- P-Pneumatic
- PL-Position light
- SA-Semiautomatic
- TC-Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
BLOCK SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	01/25/2003		Lock Rod Clip	E.E. Georgia Georgia IN
INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL				
AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
OTHER (specify)				

FEB 12 2003

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

about 1425 hours, Q554-25 heading westbound at the East End of Georgia on the Indiana Sub, while Q565-24 was stationary in the siding reported receiving an approach signal. While occupying the OS section of the East End Georgia the crew on Q554-25 observed the switch aligned reverse toward the standing Q565-24. Q554-25 stopped short of the Q565-24. Signals were removed from service and signal personnel dispatched to the scene. Inspection revealed that the internal point detector rod broke leaving the point detector circuit controller indicating a switch in the normal position with the switch points physically reversed thereby allowing a signal request cleared to the standing train in the siding while the circuitry appeared to be lined for the main track resulting in a false proceed signal. Investigation also revealed that an improper installation (clip installed backwards) of the lock rod clip that ensures that the "H" contacts center in the event that the point detector rod breaks and doesn't follow the movement of the switch points. Signal personnel replaced the broken point detector rod, properly installed the lock rod clips, performed all operational tests and upon satisfactory completion restored the signals to service. Subsequently, a system-wide instructional notice has been issued to all signal personnel to inspect all switch machines of similar make to ensure that there are no other improperly installed lock rod clips in service.