* This should not be changed as a false proceed. Rail contamination (Rule 136.51)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION **FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT**	DATE 10/25/00
MAIL TO Mr. Tom McFarlin Signal & Train Control Specialist Federal Railroad Administration 901 Locust Street - Suite 464 Kansas City, MO 64106	REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division) Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway BNSF Railroad Amarillo Service Region Amarillo Division Panhandle Sub REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title) AVP Signals

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.: assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failure should be included in Item 1. Block System.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

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The following abbreviations may be used in the report

A	-Automatic	EM	-Electromechanical
AB	-Automatic block	EP	-Electropneumatic
ACS	-Automatic cab signal	FP	-False proceed
APB	-Absolute permissive block	MP	-Manual block
ATC	-Automatic train control	M	-Mechanical
ATS	-Automatic train stop	P	-Pneumatic
CL	-Color light	PL	-Position light
CPL-	Color position light	SA	-Semiautomatic
E	-Electric	TC	-Traffic Control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE OR TRAIN NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (City and State)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS ☐ AB ☐ APB ☒ TC	10/25-00	BNSF 4594	Rail (Insulated)	Wellington KS
2 INTERLOCKING ☐ ☐ ☐ AUTOMATIC				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS ☐ ATS ☐ ATC ☐ ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

MC1LAC7-24A operating Westbound on MT 1, CP 238.5 cut their power from the rest of the train and took a signal Westward from MT 1 to MT 1. Then they were given a signal into the Yard to pick-up 4 cars. After coupling onto the cars they were lined Westward from the yard to MT 1. After traveling West of the Eastbound absolute signal the dispatcher normalized the switch and then talked them back onto their train sitting East of the Westbound Absolute Signal. The leading wheels of the BNSF 4594 remained in the OS of CP 238.5 while the power and the additional four cars were coupled onto the rest of the train. During this period of setting at this spot for @ 15 min the OS relay re-energized. The dispatcher then requested the 1 West signal clear. The 1 west signal cleared displaying an approach medium. Upon arrival several meter readings were obtained; current on the relay was 165 milliamps, voltage on the relay was .73 volts voltage on the rail was .95 volts. A .06 ohm shunt was placed on the track and the track relay de-energized with 7 ma of current on the relay. The shunt was removed and the relay re-energized. The resistance of the wheels was measured at 0.3 of an ohm. Samples of a light film of unknown origin covering the rail were then taken and the Train was talked out of the OS. The OS track relay and a meter were observed while this occurred. The relay de-energized as soon as the wheels started to move with the current on the relay going to 3 ma with the third set of trucks and 0 with the next set of wheels. The thin layer of grease coupled with the sand from the locomotive and the moisture from the rain appeared to form an insulating material which prevented the axles from shunting the OS. The subsequent train moves through this location shunted the track with out incident. A sample of this substance has been sent to the Topeka Labs for analysis.

CC: Toeber
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