

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)
November 1998

DATE
November 13, 1998

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)
Norfolk Southern Corporation
Division - Pocahontas

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Administration
16th Floor - Suite 16T20
100 Alabama Street, SW
Atlanta, GA 30303-3104

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)
Chief Engineer - Eastern Region
Communications & Signal Dept.

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.: assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.
A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.
A - Automatic
AB - Automatic block
ACS - Automatic cab signal
APB - Absolute permissive block
ATC - Automatic train control
ATS - Automatic train stop
CL - Color light
CPL - Color position light
E - Electric
EM - Electromechanical
EP - Electropneumatic
FP - False proceed
MB - Manual block
M - Mechanical
P - Pneumatic
PL - Position light
SA - Semiautomatic
TC - Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	11/4/98	8929-6659	human error	Bandy, VA
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

At approximately 6:00 AM, Train J69, a single unit helper operated by Engineer _____, had traveled westbound on the Dry Fork Branch to the west end of Bandy, where he was to clear up in the siding. After lining himself into the siding and getting in the clear, _____ was in the process of tying his unit down when he heard following train J60, Engineer _____, call a clear signal westward at the east end of Bandy. Since _____ had not yet lined the handthrow mainline switch and detail back normal, he reported the occurrence as a false proceed.

Signal personnel were called to investigate and were able to duplicate the problem. The normal switch detection relay for the handthrow switch is located at an ElectroLock cut section case about 700 feet west of the switch. Though this relay was properly down when the west end of Bandy switch was not normal, it was not affecting the electronic track code passing through the ElectroLock equipment. Investigation revealed that a handthrow switch adjacent to the ElectroLock had been removed from the track two days following the FRA 236.103 testing. When modifications were made for this removal, the maintainer erroneously cut out the circuit through the WP relay, too. Improper testing after disarrangement resulted in the wiring error going undetected at the time.

Corrections were made to the circuits, the signal system was properly tested and returned to normal service.